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Tuesday 30 June 2020

Top 16 Free Websites to Learn Hacking this 2018

  • Black Hat: The Black Hat Briefings have become the biggest and the most important security conference series in the world by sticking to our core value: serving the information security community by delivering timely, actionable security information in a friendly, vendor-neutral environment.
  • Exploit DB: An archive of exploits and vulnerable software by Offensive Security. The site collects exploits from submissions and mailing lists and concentrates them in a single database.
  • Metasploit: Find security issues, verify vulnerability mitigations & manage security assessments with Metasploit. Get the worlds best penetration testing software now.
  • Phrack Magazine: Digital hacking magazine.
  • Hack Forums: Emphasis on white hat, with categories for hacking, coding and computer security.
  • HackRead: HackRead is a News Platform that centers on InfoSec, Cyber Crime, Privacy, Surveillance, and Hacking News with full-scale reviews on Social Media Platforms.
  • Offensive Security Training: Developers of Kali Linux and Exploit DB, and the creators of the Metasploit Unleashed and Penetration Testing with Kali Linux course.
  • Hacked Gadgets: A resource for DIY project documentation as well as general gadget and technology news.
  • KitPloit: Leading source of Security Tools, Hacking Tools, CyberSecurity and Network Security.
  • SecurityFocus: Provides security information to all members of the security community, from end users, security hobbyists and network administrators to security consultants, IT Managers, CIOs and CSOs.
  • DEFCON: Information about the largest annual hacker convention in the US, including past speeches, video, archives, and updates on the next upcoming show as well as links and other details.
  • Packet Storm: Information Security Services, News, Files, Tools, Exploits, Advisories and Whitepapers.
  • NFOHump: Offers up-to-date .NFO files and reviews on the latest pirate software releases.
  • The Hacker News: The Hacker News — most trusted and widely-acknowledged online cyber security news magazine with in-depth technical coverage for cybersecurity.
  • SecTools.Org: List of 75 security tools based on a 2003 vote by hackers.
  • Hakin9: E-magazine offering in-depth looks at both attack and defense techniques and concentrates on difficult technical issues.
Posted by पाटील नंदकूमार विश्वनाथ at 20:42 0 comments

Thursday 11 June 2020

Rootkit Umbreon / Umreon - X86, ARM Samples



Pokémon-themed Umbreon Linux Rootkit Hits x86, ARM Systems
Research: Trend Micro


There are two packages
one is 'found in the wild' full and a set of hashes from Trend Micro (all but one file are already in the full package)






Download

Download Email me if you need the password  



File information

Part one (full package)

#File NameHash ValueFile Size (on Disk)Duplicate?
1.umbreon-ascii0B880E0F447CD5B6A8D295EFE40AFA376085 bytes (5.94 KiB)
2autoroot1C5FAEEC3D8C50FAC589CD0ADD0765C7281 bytes (281 bytes)
3CHANGELOGA1502129706BA19667F128B44D19DC3C11 bytes (11 bytes)
4cli.shC846143BDA087783B3DC6C244C2707DC5682 bytes (5.55 KiB)
5hideportsD41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E0 bytes ( bytes)Yes, of file promptlog
6install.sh9DE30162E7A8F0279E19C2C30280FFF85634 bytes (5.5 KiB)
7Makefile0F5B1E70ADC867DD3A22CA62644007E5797 bytes (797 bytes)
8portchecker006D162A0D0AA294C85214963A3D3145113 bytes (113 bytes)
9promptlogD41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E0 bytes ( bytes)
10readlink.c42FC7D7E2F9147AB3C18B0C4316AD3D81357 bytes (1.33 KiB)
11ReadMe.txtB7172B364BF5FB8B5C30FF528F6C51252244 bytes (2.19 KiB)
12setup694FFF4D2623CA7BB8270F5124493F37332 bytes (332 bytes)
13spytty.sh0AB776FA8A0FBED2EF26C9933C32E97C1011 bytes (1011 bytes)Yes, of file spytty.sh
14umbreon.c91706EF9717176DBB59A0F77FE95241C1007 bytes (1007 bytes)
15access.c7C0A86A27B322E63C3C29121788998B8713 bytes (713 bytes)
16audit.cA2B2812C80C93C9375BFB0D7BFCEFD5B1434 bytes (1.4 KiB)
17chown.cFF9B679C7AB3F57CFBBB852A13A350B22870 bytes (2.8 KiB)
18config.h980DEE60956A916AFC9D2997043D4887967 bytes (967 bytes)
19config.h.dist980DEE60956A916AFC9D2997043D4887967 bytes (967 bytes)Yes, of file config.h
20dirs.c46B20CC7DA2BDB9ECE65E36A4F987ABC3639 bytes (3.55 KiB)
21dlsym.c796DA079CC7E4BD7F6293136604DC07B4088 bytes (3.99 KiB)
22exec.c1935ED453FB83A0A538224AFAAC71B214033 bytes (3.94 KiB)
23getpath.h588603EF387EB617668B00EAFDAEA393183 bytes (183 bytes)
24getprocname.hF5781A9E267ED849FD4D2F5F3DFB8077805 bytes (805 bytes)
25includes.hF4797AE4B2D5B3B252E0456020F58E59629 bytes (629 bytes)
26kill.cC4BD132FC2FFBC84EA5103ABE6DC023D555 bytes (555 bytes)
27links.c898D73E1AC14DE657316F084AADA58A02274 bytes (2.22 KiB)
28local-door.c76FC3E9E2758BAF48E1E9B442DB98BF8501 bytes (501 bytes)
29lpcap.hEA6822B23FE02041BE506ED1A182E5CB1690 bytes (1.65 KiB)
30maps.c9BCD90BEA8D9F9F6270CF2017F9974E21100 bytes (1.07 KiB)
31misc.h1F9FCC5D84633931CDD77B32DB1D50D02728 bytes (2.66 KiB)
32netstat.c00CF3F7E7EA92E7A954282021DD72DC41113 bytes (1.09 KiB)
33open.cF7EE88A523AD2477FF8EC17C9DCD7C028594 bytes (8.39 KiB)
34pam.c7A947FDC0264947B2D293E1F4D69684A2010 bytes (1.96 KiB)
35pam_private.h2C60F925842CEB42FFD639E7C763C7B012480 bytes (12.19 KiB)
36pam_vprompt.c017FB0F736A0BC65431A25E1A9D393FE3826 bytes (3.74 KiB)
37passwd.cA0D183BBE86D05E3782B5B24E2C964132364 bytes (2.31 KiB)
38pcap.cFF911CA192B111BD0D9368AFACA03C461295 bytes (1.26 KiB)
39procstat.c7B14E97649CD767C256D4CD6E4F8D452398 bytes (398 bytes)
40procstatus.c72ED74C03F4FAB0C1B801687BE200F063303 bytes (3.23 KiB)
41readwrite.cC068ED372DEAF8E87D0133EAC0A274A82710 bytes (2.65 KiB)
42rename.cC36BE9C01FEADE2EF4D5EA03BD2B3C05535 bytes (535 bytes)
43setgid.c5C023259F2C244193BDA394E2C0B8313667 bytes (667 bytes)
44sha256.h003D805D919B4EC621B800C6C239BAE0545 bytes (545 bytes)
45socket.c348AEF06AFA259BFC4E943715DB5A00B579 bytes (579 bytes)
46stat.cE510EE1F78BD349E02F47A7EB001B0E37627 bytes (7.45 KiB)
47syslog.c7CD3273E09A6C08451DD598A0F18B5701497 bytes (1.46 KiB)
48umbreon.hF76CAC6D564DEACFC6319FA167375BA54316 bytes (4.21 KiB)
49unhide-funcs.c1A9F62B04319DA84EF71A1B091434C644729 bytes (4.62 KiB)
50cryptpass.py2EA92D6EC59D85474ED7A91C8518E7EC192 bytes (192 bytes)
51environment.sh70F467FE218E128258D7356B7CE328F11086 bytes (1.06 KiB)
52espeon-connect.shA574C885C450FCA048E79AD6937FED2E247 bytes (247 bytes)
53espeon-shell9EEF7E7E3C1BEE2F8591A088244BE0CB2167 bytes (2.12 KiB)
54espeon.c499FF5CF81C2624B0C3B0B7E9C6D980D14899 bytes (14.55 KiB)
55listen.sh69DA525AEA227BE9E4B8D59ACFF4D717209 bytes (209 bytes)
56spytty.sh0AB776FA8A0FBED2EF26C9933C32E97C1011 bytes (1011 bytes)
57ssh-hidden.shAE54F343FE974302F0D31776B72D0987127 bytes (127 bytes)
58unfuck.c457B6E90C7FA42A7C46D464FBF1D68E2384 bytes (384 bytes)
59unhide-self.pyB982597CEB7274617F286CA80864F499986 bytes (986 bytes)
60listen.shF5BD197F34E3D0BD8EA28B182CCE7270233 bytes (233 bytes)

part 2 (those listed in the Trend Micro article)
#File NameHash ValueFile Size (on Disk)
1015a84eb1d18beb310e7aeeceab8b84776078935c45924b3a10aa884a93e28acA47E38464754289C0F4A55ED7BB556489375 bytes (9.16 KiB)
20751cf716ea9bc18e78eb2a82cc9ea0cac73d70a7a74c91740c95312c8a9d53aF9BA2429EAE5471ACDE820102C5B81597512 bytes (7.34 KiB)
30a4d5ffb1407d409a55f1aed5c5286d4f31fe17bc99eabff64aa1498c5482a5f0AB776FA8A0FBED2EF26C9933C32E97C1011 bytes (1011 bytes)
40ce8c09bb6ce433fb8b388c369d7491953cf9bb5426a7bee752150118616d8ffB982597CEB7274617F286CA80864F499986 bytes (986 bytes)
5122417853c1eb1868e429cacc499ef75cfc018b87da87b1f61bff53e9b8e86709EEF7E7E3C1BEE2F8591A088244BE0CB2167 bytes (2.12 KiB)
6409c90ecd56e9abcb9f290063ec7783ecbe125c321af3f8ba5dcbde6e15ac64aB4746BB5E697F23A5842ABCAED36C9146149 bytes (6 KiB)
74fc4b5dab105e03f03ba3ec301bab9e2d37f17a431dee7f2e5a8dfadcca4c234D0D97899131C29B3EC9AE89A6D49A23E65160 bytes (63.63 KiB)
88752d16e32a611763eee97da6528734751153ac1699c4693c84b6e9e4fb08784E7E82D29DFB1FC484ED277C70218781855564 bytes (54.26 KiB)
9991179b6ba7d4aeabdf463118e4a2984276401368f4ab842ad8a5b8b730885222B1863ACDC0068ED5D50590CF792DF057664 bytes (7.48 KiB)
10a378b85f8f41de164832d27ebf7006370c1fb8eda23bb09a3586ed29b5dbdddfA977F68C59040E40A822C384D1CEDEB6176 bytes (176 bytes)
11aa24deb830a2b1aa694e580c5efb24f979d6c5d861b56354a6acb1ad0cf9809bDF320ED7EE6CCF9F979AEFE451877FFC26 bytes (26 bytes)
12acfb014304b6f2cff00c668a9a2a3a9cbb6f24db6d074a8914dd69b43afa452584D552B5D22E40BDA23E6587B1BC532D6852 bytes (6.69 KiB)
13c80d19f6f3372f4cc6e75ae1af54e8727b54b51aaf2794fedd3a1aa463140480087DD79515D37F7ADA78FF5793A42B7B11184 bytes (10.92 KiB)
14e9bce46584acbf59a779d1565687964991d7033d63c06bddabcfc4375c5f1853BBEB18C0C3E038747C78FCAB3E0444E371940 bytes (70.25 KiB)

More information
Posted by पाटील नंदकूमार विश्वनाथ at 19:34 0 comments

Tricks To Bypass Device Control Protection Solutions

Preface

As I wrote in a previous blog post, I had an engagement last year where my task was to exfiltrate data from a workstation on some sort of storage media. The twist in that task was Lumension Sanctuary Device Control, and the version was 4.3.2, but I am not sure how newer version work and this seems to be a more general problem with device control solution, for example with Symantec products.

But what is a device control solution? In short, they audit I/O device use and block the attempts to use unauthorized devices. This includes hardware such as USB, PS/2, FireWire, CD/DVD so basically every I/O port of a computer. In my opinion, these are pretty good things and they offer a better looking solution than de-soldering the I/O ports from the motherboards or hot-gluing them, but on the other hand, they can be bypassed.

Bypass

OK, so what is the problem? Well the way these device control solutions work is that they load a few kernel drivers to monitor the physical ports of the machine. However... when you boot up the protected computer in safe mode, depending on the device control solution software, some of these drivers are not loaded (or if you are lucky, none of those modules will be loaded...) and this opens up the possibility to exfiltrate data.

In theory, if you have admin (SYSTEM maybe?) privileges, you might as well try to unload the kernel drivers. Just do not forget, that these device control solutions also have a watchdog process, that checks the driver and automatically loads it back if it is unloaded, so look for that process and stop or suspend it first.

In my case with the Lumension Sanctuary Device Control, I have found that when I boot the Workstation protected by the device control software in Safe Mode where, software's key logger protection module is not running... so I was still unable to use a USB stick, or a storage media, but I could plug in a keyboard for example...hmmm :)

As some of you probably already figured it out, now it is possible to use a pre-programmed USB HID, for example a Teensy! : ) I know about three different project, that uses this trick like these two mentioned in a Hackaday post, or this one. Unfortunately, the site ob-security.info no longer seems to be available (well, at least it is no longer related to infosec :D ), but you can still find the blog post and the files with the Wayback Machine.

For the hardware part, the wiring of the Teensy and the SD card adaptor is the same as I showed in the post on Making a USB flash drive HW Trojan or in the Binary deployment with VBScript, PowerShell or .Net csc.exe compiler post, so I will not copy it here again.

I have to note here that there are other ways to bypass these device control solutions, like the method what Dr. Phil Polstra did with the USB Impersonator, which is basically looks for an authorized device VID/PID and then  impersonates that devices with the VID/PID.

Mitigation

Most probably, you will not need safe mode for the users, so you can just disable it... I mean, it is not that easy, but luckily there is a great blog post on how to do that. BTW, the first page of the post is for Windows XP, but you are not using XP anymore, aren't you? ;)

Alternatively, as I mentioned at the beginning, you might as well use some physical countermeasure (de-soldering/hot-gluing ports). That shit is ugly, but it kinda works.

Conclusion

Next time you will face a device control solution, try out these tricks, maybe they will work, and if they do, well, that's a lot of fun. :)

But don't get me wrong, these device control solutions and similar countermeasures are a good thing and you should use something like this! I know that they make doing business a bit harder as you are not able to plugin whatever USB stick you want, but if you buy a pile of hardware encrypted flash drives, and only allow  those to be plugged in, you are doing it right ;)

Related links


  1. Pentest Tools Free
  2. Pentesting And Ethical Hacking
  3. Pentest Tutorial
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  8. Pentest Red Team
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Posted by पाटील नंदकूमार विश्वनाथ at 14:08 0 comments

Open Sesame (Dlink - CVE-2012-4046)

A couple weeks ago a vulnerability was posted for the dlink DCS-9xx series of cameras. The author of the disclosure found that the setup application that comes with the camera is able to send a specifically crafted request to a camera on the same network and receive its password in plaintext. I figured this was a good chance to do some analysis and figure out exactly how the application carried out this functionality and possibly create a script to pull the password out of a camera.

The basic functionality of the application is as follows:

  • Application sends out a UDP broadcast on port 5978
  • Camera sees the broadcast on port 5978 and inspects the payload – if it sees that the initial part of the payload contains "FF FF FF FF FF FF" it responds (UDP broadcast port 5978) with an encoded payload with its own MAC address
  • Application retrieves the camera's response and creates another UDP broadcast but this time it sets the payload to contain the target camera's MAC address, this encoded value contains the command to send over the password
  • Camera sees the broadcast on port 5978 and checks that it is meant for it by inspecting the MAC address that has been specified in the payload, it responds with an encoded payload that contains its password (base64 encoded)

After spending some time with the application in a debugger I found what looked like it was responsible for the decoding of the encoded values that are passed:


super exciting screen shot.
After spending some time documenting the functionality I came up with the following notes (messy wall of text):

CommandComments
.JGE SHORT 0A729D36; stage1
./MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.2]; set EDX to our 1st stage half decoded buffer
.|MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.4]; set ECX to our current count/offset
.|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set EAX to our base64 encoded payload
.|MOVSX EAX,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX]; set EAX to the current value in our base64 payload
.|MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+0A841934]; set EAX/AL to a hardcoded offset of its value table is at 0a841934
.|MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ECX+EDX],AL; ECX = Offset, EDX = start of our half-decoded buffer, write our current byte there
.|INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.4]; increment our offset/count
.|INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; increment our base64 buffer to next value
.|MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.4]; set EDX to our counter
.|CMP EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.2]; compare EDX (counter) to our total size
.\JL SHORT 0A729D13; jump back if we have not finished half decoding our input value
.MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.3]; Looks like this will point at our decoded buffer
.MOV DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5],ECX; set Arg5 to our decoded destination
.MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.2]; set EAX to our half-decoded buffer
.MOV DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3],EAX; set arg3 to point at our half-decoded buffer
.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.4]; ???? 1500 decimal
.XOR ECX,ECX; clear ECX
.MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX],ECX; clear out arg4 value
.XOR EAX,EAX; clear out EAX
.MOV DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.6],EAX; clear out local.6
.JMP SHORT 0A729DAE; JUMP
./MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; move our current half-decoded dword position into EDX
.|MOV CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX]; move our current byte into ECX (CL) (dword[0])
.|SHL ECX,2; shift left 2 dword[0]
.|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; move our current dword position into EAX
.|MOVSX EDX,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+1]; move our current dword position + 1 (dword[1]) into EDX
.|SAR EDX,4; shift right 4 dword[1]
.|ADD CL,DL; add (shift left 2 dword[0]) + (shift right 4 dword[1])
.|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; set EAX to our current decoded buffer position
.|MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],CL; write our decoded (dword[0]) value to or decoded buffer
.|INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; increment our position in the decoded buffer
.|MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set EDX to our current dword position
.|MOV CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+1]; set ECX to dword[1]
.|SHL ECX,4; left shift 4 dword[1]
.|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set EAX to our current dword position
.|MOVSX EDX,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+2]; set EDX to dword[2]
.|SAR EDX,2; shift right 2 dword[2]
.|ADD CL,DL; add (left shift 4 dword[1]) + (right shift 2 dword[2])
.|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; set EAX to our next spot in the decoded buffer
.|MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],CL; write our decoded value into our decoded buffer
.|INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; move to the next spot in our decoded buffer
.|MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set EDX to our current half-decoded dword
.|MOV CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+2]; set ECX dword[2]
.|SHL ECX,6; shift left 6 dword[2]
.|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set EAX to our current half-decoded dword
.|ADD CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+3]; add dword[2] + dword[3]
.|MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; set EDX to point at our next spot in our decoded buffer
.|MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDX],CL; write our decoded byte to our decoded buffer
.|INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; move to the next spot in our decoded buffer
.|ADD DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3],4; increment our encoded buffer to point at our next dword
.|MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.4]; set ECX to our current offset?
.|ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ECX],3; add 3 to our current offset?
.|ADD DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.6],4; add 4 to our byte counter??
.|MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.2]; move total size into EAX
.|ADD EAX,-4; subtract 4 from total size
.|CMP EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.6]; compare our total bytes to read bytes
.\JG SHORT 0A729D50; jump back if we are not done
.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set EDX to our last DWORD of encoded buffer
.MOVSX ECX,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+3]; set ECX to dword[3] last byte of our half-decoded dword (dword + 3)
.INC ECX; increment the value of dword[3]
.JE SHORT 0A729E1E
.MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set EAX to our current half-decoded dword
.MOV DL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX]; set EDX (DL) to dword[0]
.SHL EDX,2; shift left 2 dword[0]
.MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set ECX to our current encoded dword position
.MOVSX EAX,BYTE PTR DS:[ECX+1]; set EAX to dword[1]
.SAR EAX,4; shift right 4 dword[1]
.ADD DL,AL; add (shifted left 2 dword[0]) + (shifted right 4 dword[1])
.MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; set ECX to point at our next spot in our decoded buffer
.MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ECX],DL; write our decoded value (EDX/DL) to our decoded buffer
.INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; move to the next spot in our decoded buffer
.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set EDX to point at our dword
.MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+1]; set EAX/AL to dword[1]
.SHL EAX,4; shift left 4 dword[1]
.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set EDX to our current dword
.MOVSX ECX,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+2]; set ECX to dword[2]
.SAR ECX,2; shift right 2 dword[2]
.ADD AL,CL; add (shifted left 4 dword[1]) + (shifted right 2 dword[2])
.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; set EDX to point at our current spot in our decoded buffer
.MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDX],AL; write our decoded value to the decoded buffer
.INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; move to the next spot in our decoded buffer
.MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; set EAX to point at our current dword
.MOV CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+2]; set ECX/CL to dword[2]
.SHL ECX,6; shift left 6 dword[2]
.MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.3]; point EAX at our current dword
.ADD CL,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+3]; add dword[3] + (shifted left 6 dword[2])
.MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; point EDX at our current decoded buffer
.MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDX],CL; write our decoded value to the decoded buffer
.INC DWORD PTR SS:[LOCAL.5]; increment our deocded buffer
.MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ARG.4]; set ECX to our current offset?
.ADD DWORD PTR DS:[ECX],3; add 4 for our current byte counter?
.JMP 0A729EA6; jump

Translated into english: the application first uses a lookup table to translate every byte in the input string, to do this it uses the value of the current byte as an offset into the table.  After it is done with "stage1" it traverses the translated input buffer a dword at a time and does some bit shifting and addition to fully decode the value. The following roughly shows the "stage2" routine:
(Dword[0] << 2) + (Dword[1] >> 4) = unencoded byte 1 
(Dword[1] << 4) + (Dword[2] >> 2) = unencoded byte 2 
(Dword[2] << 6) + Dword[3] = unencoded byte 3

I then confirmed that this routine worked on an "encoded" value that went over the wire from the application to the camera. After confirming the encoding scheme worked, I recreated the network transaction the application does with the camera to create a stand alone script that will retrieve the password from a camera that is on the same lan as the "attacker". The script can be found here, thanks to Jason Doyle for the original finding (@jasond0yle ).

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Posted by पाटील नंदकूमार विश्वनाथ at 13:34 0 comments